We theoretically and experimentally study the influence of producers' honesty on consumers' purchasing decisions. In a competitive market, producers can save wage costs by lying to their workers. Our treatments vary consumers' observability of within-firm honesty. We show that when producers' honesty is fully transparent, honesty provides a competitive advantage: Despite higher production costs, honest firms make higher profits than dishonest firms. A robustness treatment demonstrates that this result is driven by honesty concerns and not by fairness towards the workers. Our findings extend the literature on consumer social responsibility by adding firms' honesty as an important decision criterion in consumer choice.
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Introduction
Consumer social responsibility is "the conscious and deliberate choice to make certain consumption choices based on personal and moral beliefs," which may show up as "expressed activity in terms of purchasing or non-purchasing behavior" (Devinney, Auger, Eckhardt and Birtchnell 2006, p. 32) . The impact of consumer social responsibility on total consumption decisions and its drawbacks for producers is a widely debated issue in consumer research (for an overview, see e.g., Smith, 2007) . In recent years, these questions have also been addressed in controlled experimental frameworks. In the experiments by Rode, Hogarth, and Le Menestrel (2008) , Etilé and Teyssier (2012) , and Feicht, Grimm and Seebauer (2014) , consumers are willing to pay (slightly) higher prices to buy a product that implies a donation to an NGO. Bartling and Weber (2015) find that consumers accept a price premium for goods that do not harm a third person. The effect of consumer social responsibility in different competition conditions is studied in Pigors and Rockenbach (2015) . They find no indications for consumer social responsibility when the supplier is a monopolist. In competitive markets, however, when consumers can choose between different offers, consumers' purchasing behavior may make socially-responsible production profitable for suppliers. These experiments focus on payoff allocations as a proxy for social responsibility. Although distributional consequences are an important aspect, it is surely not the only influence on consumers' "moral beliefs." Companies' (lack of) compliance, for example, with human rights, animal rights, environmental protection, political rights, tax laws, and workers' rights are important factors in the recent discussions of corporate social responsibility and as triggers for boycott calls by "ethical consumers." O'Connor and Meister (2008) ask subjects to rank-order different measures commonly found in corporate social responsibility communication and identify honesty as the most important attribute of a corporation.
3 However, the extent to which a corporation's honesty actually influences consumers' purchasing behavior has not yet been studied. In this paper, we close this gap by examining the role of a corporation's honesty on consumers' purchasing behavior and disentangling the effects of honesty from distributional concerns.
In our experimental market, firms offer consumers a good with a fixed induced monetary value. Each firm determines the price of the product and the wage paid to its worker.
A firm's worker either has a high or a low ability for the production process. High (low) ability workers entail low (high) production costs. The worker's ability is observed by the firm, but 2 not by the worker. The firm communicates the ability to its worker, and based upon this communicated ability, a pre-specified wage is paid to the worker: a high wage for high ability and a low wage for low ability. The firm's communication does not have to be truthful.
Obviously, firms can save overall production costs by being dishonest: A dishonest firm may communicate a low ability to its high ability worker and thus benefit from the low production cost of the high ability worker, but only pay the low wage. In our research, we ask whether consumers honor firms' honesty towards their workers. Specifically, we are interested in whether consumers would pay a higher price to buy from an honest firm and, if so, identifying the conditions that make honesty a competitive advantage.
We address these questions in an experimental Bertrand duopoly with two firms and two consumers. The experimental treatments vary the consumers' information on the firms' honesty towards their workers and allow testing for consumers' preferences for within-firm honesty. We find that absent any wage and honesty information passed to consumers, honesty is very low, resulting in low wages. However, when consumers see both workers' wages and firms' honesty, consumers take firms' honesty as a significant criterion for their purchasing decisions. This effect is strong enough to render honesty a competitive advantage for firms.
Honest firms make higher profits by selling more units, albeit not at higher prices. In a robustness treatment that separates honesty from fairness concerns for the worker, we show that this result is driven by honesty and not by consumers' distributional fairness concerns.
We complement the experimental findings by presenting a simple model of consumers' purchasing decisions, which incorporates social preferences as well as preferences for being involved in honest transactions. Our data show that apart from allocative preferences, preferences for buying from an honest firm play a crucial role in consumers' purchasing decisions.
The market model
In our experiment, we study a bilateral Bertrand duopoly with two firms and and two consumers and . Firms offer a good on the market, consumers may purchase at most one unit of the good, and each firm may potentially serve both consumers. Each consumer has a fixed valuation for the good (in the experiment = 30). Each firm consists of a manager and a worker , ∈ {A, B}. The manager determines the price for the units of the good her firm offers (in the experiment ∈ {0,1, … , }) and determines the wage of her worker (for details see below). The worker produces the firm's units of the good.
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Before the market starts, a "state of the world" ∈ , is randomly drawn, whereby both realizations are equally likely. You may think of the state as a proxy for the production environment of the firm. A firm's worker does not know the exact production environment, i.e., the realization of , but provides a guess for . The accuracy of the worker's guess is a proxy for the worker's ability and determines the production costs he entails for his firm. If the worker guessed right ( = ), the worker is a "high ability worker" who entails low production costs (in the experiment = 0) for his firm. Otherwise, if ≠ , the worker entails high production costs > (in the experiment = 6) for his firm.
The firm's manager has complete information on the production environment and the worker's guess, i.e., knows both and . The manager informs her worker whether he guessed Obviously, a manager profits from having a high ability worker (a worker who guessed right), as he entails low production costs. The manager has the lowest costs + = 3 if her worker guessed right and she is dishonest by informing her worker that he guessed wrong. [ , \ ∈ { , } paid by firms and and finally the prices [ , \ ∈ {0,1, … , } asked by the firms and . The production costs [ , \ ∈ { , } and the managers' honesty can be derived from Z. Each consumer ] ∈ { , } chooses an action (^∈ {0, _,`}, where 0 represents the decision not to buy, _ represents buying at firm , and ` represents buying at firm . We assume that consumers choose actions that maximize their utility %^(( a , ( b |Z). With respect to our research focus, we allow the consumer's utility function %^ to depend on the monetary payoffs of the market participants as well as on the honesty within the firm the consumer is buying from. To be more specific, we model the consumer's utility function as follows:
The function e^(( a , ( b |Z) captures consumer ]'s utility from the monetary payoffs of the players in the duopoly market. A consumer ] who only cares about her own monetary payoff is characterized by e^(( a , ( b |Z) = Π 56789:;< (see equation (1)). More generally, a consumer may have social preferences and not only care about her own monetary profit, but also about the profits of the interaction partners. A prominent example for social preferences is inequity aversion as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , expressed in the following utility function:
where q = { [ , \ , [ , \ , , } is the set of players in the duopoly market, and Π N is the monatry payoff of player r ∈ q as described in equations (1) -(3). The i-term captures the disutility from disadvantageous payoff comparisons, i.e., the cases where other players have a higher payoff. The n-term captures the disutility from advantageous payoff comparisons, i.e., the cases where other players have a lower payoff. The assumption i ≥ n expresses the idea that disadvantageous inequity looms larger than advantageous inequity.
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Importantly, the function e only incorporates the monetary payoffs, independent of how these allocations arose. In our model of consumer choice, consumers may care about the process that led to the payoff allocation and potentially experience disutility when buying from a firm in which the manager lied to the worker. This disutility is captured in the function f^(( a , ( b |Z).
In our market, managers may tell a black lie by lying to a worker who guessed right or an (altruistic) white lie by lying to a worker who guessed wrong (see Erat and Gneezy, 2012 , for a categorization of lies). To acknowledge that "lying costs" have been found to be proportional to the "size of the lie" (Gneezy, 2005) , we assume that the disutility of buying from a dishonest firm is proportional to the consequences of the lie, i.e., the resulting wage difference | − |. We numerically derive the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions for the duopoly market for different constellations of the Fehr-Schmidt parameters i and n and the honesty parameters t u and t v (for details, see Appendix A2). Managers' utility function is defined in analogy to the consumers' utility function (4). 4 We consider different parameter constellations composed of consumers and/or managers that are either selfish or inequity averse and either averse to dishonesty or not. The resulting equilibrium outcomes are presented in table 9 in
Appendix A2. The table shows that whenever all duopolists are selfish (cases 1-3 in table 9), managers lie to workers who guessed right (and are honest to workers who guessed wrong), and consumers' market power leads to extremely low equilibrium prices of 0, 1, or 2 as in a discrete Bertrand duopoly (Pigors and Rockenbach, 2015) . The same outcomes occur if players are inequity averse (cases 4-6 in table 9). The intuition is that if the prices are low, consumers achieve the highest monetary payoffs and only suffer from advantageous inequity. The consumption choice only distributes the inequity within the firm (i.e., between manager and worker) and keeps the advantageous inequity towards the firm constant. The decision to buy at the low price firm reduces the possible disadvantageous inequity towards the other consumer. are equilibrium outcomes where managers honestly pay the high wage for the right guess. When both workers guessed right, three types of equilibrium outcomes occur. In the first type (case 14 in table 9), both managers are honest, ask for a price of 2 and share the market. In the second type (cases 12, 17, and 25 in table 9), one manager is honest, while the other is dishonest. The honest manager asks for a price of up to 3 and serves both consumers. The dishonest manager has no sales. Finally, in the third type (case 13 in table 9), the honest and the dishonest manager ask for different prices (2 and 0, respectively) and share the market.
An important prediction following from our model is that under selfish preferences, as well as under Fehr-Schmidt preferences, but absent any lying aversion, dishonest firms are not expected to sell fewer units. However, when consumers are averse to buying from dishonest firms, there are equilibria in which honest firms sell more units and even make higher profits, despite the higher costs associated with honesty (case 25 in table 9). To test these predictions, in particular consumers' aversion to buying from a dishonest firm, we conduct an experimental study with treatments allowing us to disentangle the different effects.
The experimental treatments, hypotheses, and implementation
Experimental treatments
In our main treatment Full Info, consumers perfectly observe the state , the workers' guesses, the managers' information on the accuracy of the worker's guess and the resulting wage. Based upon this, consumers can infer managers' honesty to potentially include it in their purchasing decisions as modeled in equation (4). We compare Full Info to a control treatment Wage Info where workers' wages are known, but managers' honesty cannot be inferred. In Wage Info, consumers are informed about information provided by managers to their worker and the wage paid, but the workers' guesses are not revealed. Thus, consumers who only care about the final payoff to the worker, but not how it came about (i.e., t u = t v = 0 in equation (6)), should not act differently in the treatments. Finally, as a baseline we study treatment No Info, in which consumers just see the prices the two firms ask for but not the workers' guesses and the managers' information passed to the workers. Thus, consumers neither see the wages nor can they infer managers' honesty. 
Hypotheses
In our setup, managers have strong incentives to lie to reduce their wage costs. Yet in light of recent literature, we should not expect all managers to lie, even when consumers cannot detect it. Various studies show that subjects are lying averse (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe, Johannesson, 2009; Gneezy, Rockenbach and Serra-Garcia, 2013) and that the propensity to lie depends on the monetary consequences of lying and is highly heterogeneous among subjects (Gibson, Tanner and Wagner, 2013) . Some subjects are even found to be "purely" lying averse, independent of the monetary benefits from lying (e.g., Erat and Gneezy, 2012; López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013; Abeler, Becker and Falk, 2014) . This leads to:
Hypothesis 1 Independent of the treatment, not all managers lie to their worker.
The treatments may, however, influence managers' honesty. The better consumers can infer managers' honesty, the more honest managers can be assumed to be. Two effects pointing in the same direction nurture this hypothesis. First, managers who have image concerns may be more reluctant to lie the more transparent lying is (see, e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) . Second, managers who deem it possible that consumers react to lying may increase honesty the better it can be detected.
Although honesty is not observable in Wage Info, the higher costs associated with paying the high wage may lead consumers to interpret a high wage as a signal of manager's honesty. We may thus expect honesty in Wage Info to be higher than in No Info but less than in Full Info:
Hypothesis 2 Honesty increases with the information consumers receive (Full
There is experimental evidence that subjects are sensitive not only to the final payoff allocation, but also to the procedure that produced the allocation (Frey, Benz and Stutzer, 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2005; Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels, 2005 and Masuchi (2010) show that "dishonesty provokes costly third-party punishment." 6 Thus, we may expect consumers to not only take the final payoff distribution into account, but also whether or not the allocation was achieved by dishonest actions. Even if the dishonesty is vis-à-vis another participant, consumers may prefer not to buy from a dishonest manager in order to avoid participating in immoral behavior and keep a positive (self-) image while consuming Tirole, 2006, 2011) . These considerations are reflected in the positive t u and t v in our model of consumer choice described in section 3 and lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Consumers with honesty concerns prefer to buy from an honest manager, as long as the price is not too high. As a result, honest managers may sell significantly more units than dishonest managers.
The effects described in hypotheses 2 and 3 impact the wages paid. Since increased honesty rates lead to increased wages, it follows that:
Hypothesis 4 Wages increase with the information that consumers receive (Full
Info > Wage Info > No Info).
Experimental implementation
To account for learning effects, the stage-game market was repeated for 30 periods with fixed roles and partner matching. During the experiment, assigned letters A and B distinguished firms, and consumers were assigned the letters X and Y. We framed the market by using the words "manager," "worker," "consumer," "wage," "buying," etc. However, we refrained from using terms like "honesty" or "lying" to avoid loaded language and potential experimenter demand effects. The managers were instructed to inform the worker whether the guess was right or wrong and told that this information does not have to be correct. The state was called "state of the period" and was the same for all groups in the same session.
We conducted six sessions of the experiment in November 2014 at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). We recruited subjects using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Thirty subjects participated in every session, leading to 180 participants overall and ten independent observations (markets of six subjects) for every treatment. At the beginning of the experiment, written instructions 7 were distributed and read aloud. The experimental interaction was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007 
Results
We present our experimental results in this section. First, we analyze the treatment differences regarding managers' honesty (section 5.1) before turning to consumers' decisions (section 5.2).
In section 5.3, we ask whether consumers' behavior results in higher payoffs for honest managers. Finally, in a robustness check, we show that our results are driven by a preference for honesty rather than fairness concerns (section 5.4). In the following, all comparisons between treatments use the two-sided Mann-Whitney U test (MWU), and all comparisons within treatments use the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR), unless stated otherwise.
Treatment effects on wages and honesty
Since guessing right is pure chance, we should expect that workers guess correctly in about 50% of the cases. As row 3 in table 2 shows, this is indeed the case. 9 Thus, under full honesty, in half of the cases workers receive a low wage of 3, while in the other half they receive a high wage of 7, resulting in an average wage of 5. As shown in the first row of 8 The initial endowment and the roundly endowment could cover potential losses which are possible for subjects in the roles of managers (from not trading or trading at prices lower than costs). It never happened that a subject had a negative account in one point of time. 
Result 1
In all treatments, there is some degree of honesty as well as a fraction of managers that never lies (cf. hypothesis 1). Information significantly increases the overall honesty compared to No Info (cf. hypothesis 2). Due to the increased honesty, wages are higher in the information treatments compared to No Info (cf. hypothesis 4). Interestingly, there are no differences between the two information conditions regarding honesty or wages.
The partial information on honesty that may be inferred in Wage Info seems sufficient to increase wages and honesty over No Info.
Consumer choices
To describe consumers' choice, we report an alternative-specific conditional logit model in table 4 (McFadden, 1974 ). The choice model specifies the available alternatives for the consumer for every single decision she faces in a period (called case), represented by the two potentially different offers. 13 Alternative-specific variables are the attributes of an offer, i.e., price and the information about wage and honesty. The dependent variable is Buy, which equals one for the accepted offer. As a case-specific variable, we include the period, which is not significant and not reported. In all treatments, the price has a highly significant negative influence. In No Info, when the price is the only information provided to consumers, they buy the cheaper good in 96% of the cases in which in two firms ask for different prices. In Wage Info, the wage has a significant positive influence on consumer choices. The high wage may be viewed as a strong signal for honesty. In Full Info, we compare the four different constellations 12 of manager's honesty and worker's guess. The base category is a wrong guess and a manager who honestly pays the low wage. The third row of table 4 shows that consumers' propensity to buy is not increased if a manager dishonestly pays the higher wage. Hence, telling a white lie does not increase consumers' propensity to buy. Conversely, consumers strongly react to black lies. Consumers' propensity to buy is significantly reduced if managers are dishonest to pay the low wage (cf. line 4) and significantly increased if they honestly pay the high wage (cf. line 5).
Notice that this strong reaction to lying is even more remarkable since we deliberately avoided using morally loaded wordings in the experiment, such as "lying" or "dishonesty." It may well be that this effect becomes even stronger when using a morally loaded wording. Notes: Alternative-specific conditional logit model (McFadden's choice model) for the cases in which consumers buy. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by consumer id: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Buy. High wage is a binary variable that is one ( = 7), when the manager sends the signal that the worker guessed right and it is zero ( = 3), when the manager send the signal that the guess is wrong. Case-specific variables (not reported, not significant): Period.
Result 2 In No Info consumers almost always buy the cheaper good. In Full Info when
managers' honesty is fully transparent, consumers reward honest and punish dishonest managers in case the worker guessed right (cf. hypothesis 3). In Wage Info, the high wage significantly increases the consumers' likelihood to buy.
Profitability of being honest
In this section, we analyze whether consumers' "honoring" of managers' honesty in Full Info is sufficient to render honesty profitable for managers. To gain a first impression, we focus on special market constellations in Full Info. The first constellation features the situation that both workers guessed right, yet one manager is honest while the other manager is dishonest. Table 5 shows that the honest manager, who has to bear the higher wage costs, asks for a considerably higher price (9.29) than the dishonest manager (6.71). Nonetheless, the honest 13 manager sells considerably more units (1.46) than the dishonest manager (0.54), which is sufficient to achieve a considerably higher profit (5.00) than the dishonest manager (1.50). This constellation corresponds to cases 17 and 25 in table 9 of our equilibrium analysis and qualitatively confirms our predictions made under the assumption of dishonesty aversion. The second constellation features the situation in which both managers pay the low wage. While one manager is honest to a worker who guessed wrong, the other manager is dishonest to a worker who guessed right. Both managers ask for very similar prices (11.16 and 12.21, respectively), despite their different total production costs (9 for the honest manager and 3 for the dishonest, respectively). Table 5 shows that the honest manager sells considerably more units (1.42) than the dishonest manager (0.51), which is sufficient to make a considerably higher profit (6.05) than the dishonest manager (1.30). Our equilibrium analysis shows that, absent any dishonesty aversion, honest and dishonest managers are expected to sell identical amounts of units (cases 2 and 5 in table 9). Under dishonesty aversion, however, there are equilibria exhibiting "punishment" of the dishonest manager (cases 8, 16, 19 and 23 in table 9). (6)).
Result 3 Honesty is highly unprofitable when it is not observed by consumers (No Info).
In Wage Info, the profits of honest and dishonest managers are not different. When consumers have Full Info on managers' honesty, however, honest firms make significantly more profit than dishonest firms. (Feess, Schramm, and Wohlschlegel, 2014) and that subjects with a social value orientation underestimate norm violations of others (Irlenbusch and Ter Meer, 2013) .
Robustness check: Separating fairness and honesty
If paying the high (low) wage to a worker who entails low (high) production costs is considered fair, a manager sending correct information is honest and fair at the same time. The treatment Full Info does not provide the possibility to be fair without simultaneously being honest. We challenge the profitability of being honest, reported in result 3, by separating fairness and honesty in an additional treatment, No Honesty Frame. This treatment is a framing variation of the Full Info treatment. As in Full Info, the worker guesses the state of the world, the worker's guess determines the firm's production costs and the manager -but not the worker -knows the accuracy of the worker's guess. However, different from Full Info, the manager does not inform the worker about the correctness of the guess and the resulting wage but instead only communicates the wage (either = 3 or = 7) to the worker. Thus, the treatment No Honesty Frame is identical to Full Info with respect to fairness considerations, but honesty is not an issue with the communication within the firm. In particular, paying the high (low) wage to a worker who entails low (high) production costs is not confounded with being honest.
Hence, the treatment No Honesty Frame captures the mere fairness effect, and any differences to Full Info can be attributed to consumers' reactions to (dis)honesty.
In treatment No Honesty Frame, we conducted new experimental sessions with 60 new subjects, which led to 10 independent observations. 15 Strikingly, managers pay the "fair wage"
(i.e., the high (low) wage to a worker who entails low (high) production costs) significantly less Thus, when only fairness is at stake, and not honesty, fairness is significantly reduced. an explanation for the reduction in fairness. It shows that managers paying a high wage to a correctly guessing worker are not "rewarded" by a higher profit; instead they earn a lower profit (however, not significantly). Thus, fairness alone does not generate higher manager profits, and the profitability of being honest in Full Info seems to stem from consumers' aversion to being involved in trades based upon dishonesty.
Result 4 Separating fairness and honesty shows that the profitability of being honest in
Full Info stems from consumers' aversion to being involved in trades involving dishonesty.
Conclusions
In this paper, we experimentally study the influence of producers' honesty on consumers' purchasing decisions. We find that when producers' honesty is fully transparent to consumers, being honest provides a competitive advantage. Honest firms make higher profits by selling more units, albeit not at higher prices. The synopsis of the treatments shows that this result only holds when producers' honesty is fully transparent. When the market provides strong signals for honesty but leaves consumers with some uncertainty (as in Wage Info), being honest is not more profitable than being dishonest, but also not less profitable. When information on honesty is completely absent, honesty is detrimental for the firm's profit (as in No Info) . The competitive advantage of honesty in Full Info is consistent with the assumption of a disutility from being involved in a dishonest transaction. This disutility is independent of any social preferences concerning the final payoff allocation, as assumed in our simple model of consumer choice.
Our findings extend the literature on consumer social responsibility by showing that a firm's honesty -apart from allocative preferences -is an important decision criterion in consumer choice. Yet they show that in order to exploit the competitive advantage of honesty, the firm (or any party interested in promoting honesty) has to strive for full transparency on the honesty of the market participants. 
Appendix
A1 Figures and tables
A2 Subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of the duopoly market numerically. To do so, we have to specify the model parameters i, n, t u and t v . Since there are no obvious parameter choices for t u and t v , we exemplarily present a dishonesty aversion with t u = 0.5 and t v = 0.1 in the following considerations. In our numerical calculations, we considered a wide range of parameter choices, however, the results do not change qualitatively.
As inequity aversion parameters, we chose i = 1.5 and n = 0.5 as it is well in the range of experimentally observed values (e.g., Blanco, Engelmann and Norman, 2011) . To present a 
A3 Instructions
A3.1 Experimental instructions for treatment Full Info
Instructions for the experiment
General information
We welcome you to this economic experiment. It is very important that you read the following explanations carefully. If you have any questions, please direct them to us.
In this experiment, you can earn money according to your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. During the experiment, it is not allowed to talk to other participants of the experiment. Non-compliance with this rule will result in exclusion from the experiment and from all payments. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e., none of the other participants learn the identity of the person who has made a specific decision. The payment is also anonymous, i.e., no participant learns the payments of other participants.
During the experiment, your entire income is calculated in points. The total number of points achieved during the experiment will be converted into Euro at the end, with 30 points = 1 Euro.
At the end of today's experiment, you will receive the number of points earned during the experiment plus a 2.50 € show-up fee from us in cash. In addition, at the beginning of the experiment, you receive an initial endowment of 100 points. In the following pages, we will explain to you the detailed procedure of the experiment.
Information on the experiment
Course of the experiment
•
The experiment consists of 30 rounds; each round has the same structure.
• You are part of a group of 6 members. During the entire experiment, you will interact exclusively with the members of your group. The composition of the group remains the same across all rounds.
Firms, managers, workers, and consumers
• There are two firms (A and B) and two consumers (X and Y).
• Each of the two firms consists of a manager and a worker. At the beginning of the experiment it will be randomly determined which manager and which worker form firm A and which manager and which worker form firm B. This assignment remains unchanged over the entire experiment.
• Which role you take is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment and remains unchanged during the entire experiment. Please note that your role does not permit any conclusions about your identity.
Production
• In both firms, the worker produces several units of an identical good.
• A state is randomly assigned to each round: "Red" and "Blue," with a probability of 50% each. At the beginning of each round, the firm's worker guesses the current state. If the worker's guess is right, the firm has production costs of 0 points. If the worker's guess is wrong, the firm has production costs of 6 points. The workers do not learn the true state of the round.
Production Costs
State "Red" State "Blue"
Worker guesses "Red" 0 6
Worker guesses "Blue" 6 0
• A firm's manager learns the true state of the round and the guess made by her/his worker. The manager informs her/his worker whether her/his guess was right or wrong. This information may be but does not have to be true. If the manager informs the worker that her/his guess was right, she/he will pay a wage of 7 points to her/his worker. If the manager informs the worker that her/his guess was wrong, she/he will pay a wage of 3 points to her/his worker.
Wage
Manager informs the worker that her/his guess was right. 7
Manager informs the worker that her/his guess was wrong. 3
• A firm's manager determines the price at which the firm offers the good (integer numbers between 0 and 30 points).
Purchase
• Each consumer can buy up to one unit of the good and decides whether she/he buys the goods from firm A, from firm B or whether she/he does not buy the good. The good has a value of 30 points to each of both consumers.
• If a consumer buys the good from firm A, she/he will pay the price set by the manager of firm A. If a consumer buys at firm B, she/he will pay the price set by the manager of firm B. By purchasing, a consumer receives 30 points minus the price paid. A consumer who does not buy a good receives 0 points.
Consumer Profit
Consumer buys one unit of the good 30 -price
Consumer does not buy a unit 0
•
The number of goods a firm sells depends on the purchasing decisions of the two consumers. Therefore, a firm can sell none, one or two units.
Income in each round
Each participant receives a round endowment of 5 points in each round. The rest of the income depends on the decisions as follows: 
Income of the participants in a round
Course of the experiment
Before the start of the first round, you are informed about your role (manager A, worker A, manager B, worker B, consumer X or consumer Y). All rounds take place according to the following scheme:
Step 0: State of the round
•
The state of the round is randomly drawn, with a probability of 50% it is "Red" and with a probability of 50% it is "Blue".
Step 1: Actions of the workers
The workers guess the state of the round.
• The workers produce the units of the good.
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Step 2: Actions of the workers and the managers • The managers learn the state of the round and the guess of their worker.
• The managers inform their worker whether their guess was right or not (this information may be but does not have to be true) and about the resulting wage.
• The managers determine the price of the good.
Step 3: Actions of the consumers
•
The consumers learn the state of the round, the workers' guesses, as well as the information sent by the managers to the workers about whether their guesses were right or not and the resulting wages.
• The consumers learn the price of the good of firm A and the price of the good of firm B.
• The consumers decide whether and from which firm they buy one unit of the good.
Step 4: Information
The workers receive the information from their managers about whether their guess was right or not as well as the resulting wage.
• Both managers learn the guess of the respective other worker and receive the information sent by the other manager to the worker whether the guess was right or not.
• Both managers, both workers, and both consumers are informed about the prices of both firms and the purchase decisions of both consumers.
• Each participant learns her/his round income.
Total income
Your total income is the sum of the incomes of all rounds plus the start income of 100 points.
Good luck!
A3.2 Experimental instructions for treatment No Honesty Frame
To avoid repetition and highlight the differences, we describe the parts in the instructions of treatment No Honesty Frame that differ from Full Info.
Third bullet point in Production:
• A firm's manager learns the true state of the round and the guess for her/his worker. The manager determines her/his worker's wage. The manager may pay a wage of 7 points or a wage of 3 points to her/his worker.
Income table in Income in each round:
Income of the participants in a round 
Second bullet point in
Step 2:
Step 2: Actions of the workers and the managers
•
The managers determine the wage of their worker.
First bullet point in
Step 3:
•
The consumers learn the state of the round, the workers' guesses as well as wages of the workers.
First and second bullet point in
Step 4:
•
The workers receive the information on their wage.
• Both managers learn the guess and the wage of the respective other worker.
